America’s Munitions Bottleneck Is Becoming A National Security Problem

The United States can still produce the munitions it needs. The more difficult question is whether it can sustain that production in a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Recent wars have exposed how quickly stockpiles can be depleted and how slowly they can be replenished. The Pentagon’s push to expand artillery production after 2022 reflects that concern, with officials emphasizing the need to rebuild capacity across the munitions industrial base. 

In an interview with Military.com, Kevin Capozzoli, CEO and co-founder of Critical Materials Group, described the issue as one of endurance rather than immediate readiness. His company focuses on producing energetic materials, the explosives and related compounds that power munitions, and is working to expand domestic production through modular, automated manufacturing systems. 

Capozzoli said the system is “producing” today, but the real constraint is how long it can continue to do so under wartime conditions. 

Energetics Are the Foundation Most People Overlook

Public debate about defense production tends to focus on finished weapons. Missiles, artillery shells, and aircraft dominate the conversation. Capozzoli’s argument begins earlier in the supply chain. Energetics, which include explosives such as RDX and TNT as well as propellants and detonators, are what allow those systems to function at all. 

The Department of Defense has identified this layer of the supply chain as a vulnerability. A federal review of defense-critical supply chains found that energetic materials and munitions production suffer from limited domestic capacity and fragile supplier networks.  

That vulnerability becomes more serious when demand spikes. The war in Ukraine highlighted how quickly inventories can be drawn down and how difficult it is to scale production in response.

An Industrial Base Frozen in Time

Capozzoli said much of the U.S. energetics infrastructure still reflects World War II-era production models. In many cases, the facilities themselves date back to that period. 

The Holston Army Ammunition Plant, one of the country’s primary sources of high explosives, was built during World War II and remains central to current production. Army officials have acknowledged that modernization is ongoing but that the broader industrial base still relies heavily on legacy infrastructure.  

The persistence of those systems is partly structural. Once a manufacturing process is approved for military use, changing it requires extensive testing and certification. Capozzoli said that the process can take 18 to 24 months, which discourages incremental improvements. 

A 2023 Army Science Board report reached a similar conclusion, warning that aging facilities, compliance requirements, and rigid processes limit the ability to increase production quickly. 

The Real Bottleneck Is in Processing

Capozzoli drew a clear distinction between access to raw materials and the ability to turn those materials into usable explosives. The United States has domestic access to chemical precursors. The constraint lies in processing capacity. 

That conversion step, which produces energetic powders and compounds, is concentrated in a limited number of facilities. The Defense Department has identified similar chokepoints in its supply chain analysis, noting that certain production steps depend on too few suppliers and lack redundancy.  

Capozzoli also pointed to continued reliance on foreign suppliers in at least one area, saying the United States depends on a single European source for TNT. 

The scale gap between past and present capacity is significant. During World War II, U.S. facilities such as Holston Ordnance Works were producing and shipping more than 1 million pounds of explosives per day, while current efforts are focused on expanding annual RDX production capacity from roughly 8 million pounds to about 15 million pounds.

A System with Too Many Single Points of Failure

The effort to replenish stockpiles after 2022 exposed bigger structural risks. Capozzoli said the process revealed “hundreds of single-point failures” across the munitions supply chain. 

Army modernization plans reflect the same concern. Officials have emphasized the need to reduce reliance on individual facilities and increase resilience across the industrial base. 

In practical terms, that means moving away from a system where disruption at one plant can significantly reduce national output.

A Push Toward Modular, Distributed Production

Critical Materials Group is attempting to address these issues by changing how energetics are produced. Capozzoli said the company is developing modular, continuous-flow manufacturing systems that replace large batch processes with smaller, automated production lines. 

This approach is already used in industries such as pharmaceuticals and specialty chemicals. It allows for tighter control of reactions, improved safety, and reduced reliance on large facilities. Smaller systems also make it easier to scale production by adding additional lines or sites.

Automation plays a central role. By reducing the need for workers to be physically close to hazardous processes, it improves safety while maintaining output. It also enables more consistent production, which is critical for military-grade materials.

The Department of Defense has highlighted similar priorities in its industrial strategy, including automation, distributed manufacturing, and reduced concentration risk in critical supply chains.  

Why It Matters Before the Next Conflict

Capozzoli’s argument is ultimately about timing. The United States has historically been able to mobilize its industrial base in response to major conflicts. World War II remains the most prominent example.

He said the goal now should be to avoid relying on that kind of emergency response. 

If the United States modernizes its energetics production and expands capacity, it strengthens its ability to sustain operations and deter adversaries. If it does not, it risks entering future conflicts with limited surge capacity and fragile supply chains.

That risk does not sit at the visible edge of the arsenal. It sits beneath it, in the materials that make everything else possible.